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Parol Evidence to Vary or Contradict Consideration
Clauses in Missouri
INTRODUCTION
One aspect of Missouri law which has escaped consideration by
legal writers in recent years is the effect and ramifications of the
well-known but seldom understood parol evidence rule. Perhaps one
reason for the failure to analyze this rule is the staggering amount
of litigation construing it and the myriad exceptions and counter-
exceptions employed in its application. This note will not attempt
to cover the entire scope of the parol evidence rule but will be confined
to the effect of parol evidence offered to vary or contradict the con-
sideration clause in written instruments.
As a general proposition the parol evidence rule is said to apply:
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in
a writing to which they both have assented as the complete and
accurate integration of that contract, evidence, whether parol or
otherwise, of antecedent understanding and negotiations will not
be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the
writing."
It is apparent that the parol evidence rule, as defined, requires as
conditions precedent, first, that the parties must have made a contract
in writing,2 and second, that they must have assented to the writing
as the complete and accurate integration of that contract. Since the
problem of the admissibility of parol evidence to vary or contradict
written consideration stems historically from its application to deeds,
these conditions precedent have been generally ignored, and this has
resulted in the application of the rule to writings which are not true
contracts.
I. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION PRIOR TO 1893
A. Deeds
The first reported Missouri case which dealt with the admissibility
of parol evidence to vary or contradict a written consideration clause
was Henderson v. Hendersons which arose in 1850. There the grantee
of a deed brought an action of covenant against the grantor's execu-
1. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 573 (1960). This statement of the rule summarizes
and follows Missouri court definitions of the rule. E.g., Commerce Trust Co. v.
Watts, 360 Mo. 971, 231 S.W.2d 817 (1950); Davison v. Rodes, 299 S.W.2d 591
(Mo. Ct. App. 1956); Sol Abrahams & Son Constr. Co. v. Osterholm, 136 S.W.2d
86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940).
2. Corbin, Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 645 (1944).
3. 13 Mo. 151 (1850).
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tors. In the consideration clause decedent-grantor acknowledged
receipt of $766 as consideration for the land, but at the trial the
grantor's executors were permitted to show by parol that no con-
sideration had in fact been paid and that both parties intended the
subsequent reconveyance of the land to the grantor. The Supreme
Court reversed a trial court judgement for defendant and held such
testimony inadmissible inasmuch as such an admission would destroy
the operation of the deed as a conveyance. The court went on to in-
dicate that parol evidence is never admissible if it would destroy the
operative effect of the deed, but evidence of the amount of purchase
money actually paid is admissible if the amount is material. Thus,
recited consideration is not necessarily conclusive.
The Henderson decision reflects a liberalization of the earlier com-
mon law rule whereby neither the grantor nor the grantee were
allowed to vary any statement of consideration in the deed by parol.
However, this strict rule became relaxed, first in equity and then at
law., Specifically, parol evidence became admissible to show con-
sideration which was not repugnant to the consideration recited in
the deed.7 Thus, the decision in Henderson was in substantial con-
formity with the general trend away from the strict common law rule.
However, in the forty-three year period following the Henderson
decision, the case was not strictly adhered to by the Missouri courts.
For instance, parol evidence was admitted to vary or contradict
recited consideration in deeds in a grantee's action for breach of cov-
enant against a prior grantor because such evidence was relevant in
determining grantee's damages.8 Further, the Henderson rule that
parol evidence must be relevant to an issue of damages before being
admissible was often ignored. For example, in Aull Savings Bank v.
Aull's Adm'r,9 the grantee of certain realty sought to recover from
grantor's estate the reasonable rental value for grantor's continued
use of the premises following the sale. The executors sought to show
by parol that rent-free occupation by grantor was a part of the con-
sideration for the transfer in addition to that expressed in the deed.
The introduction of this evidence over plaintiff-grantee's objection was
sustained on appeal, primarily on two grounds: first, that the evidence
did not affect the operative effect of the deed, and second, that the
consideration may be explained by parol since it occupies no higher
4. Id. at 153.
5. 1 WIMSTON, CONTRACTS §l1SA (3d ed. 1957).
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Lambert v. Estes, 99 Mo. 604, 13 S.W. 284 (1890); Allen v. Kennedy, 91 Mo.
324, 2 S.W. 142 (1886); Miller v. McCoy, 50 Mo. 214 (1872); Guinotte v. Chou-
teau, 34 Mo. 154 (1863).
9. 80 Mo. 199 (1883).
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position than an ordinary receipt for money.'0 No mention was
made of the Henderson requirement that the evidence be relevant to
an issue of damages.
But despite such instances of deviation from the Henderson doc-
trine, the prohibition there laid down against the destruction of a
deed by the introduction of parol was uniformly followed," and
extended to include parol which defeated the operative effect of a
covenant contained in a deed. For example, MacLeod v. Skiles 2
involved a deed containing a covenant in which the grantor war-
ranted to defend grantee's title except as to certain taxes. Grantee
paid these taxes but then sued for their recovery, arguing that the
grantor had agreed in a separate writing to pay all taxes including
the ones expressly excepted in the deed. The exclusion of this evi-
dence by the trial court was affirmed on appeal. The court held that
a grantee could not accept a deed with a covenant and escape the
force and effect of the covenant by parol evidence."
Thus Missouri was following the trend away from the old common
law rule strictly prohibiting parol evidence to vary or contradict
express consideration in deeds. But deeds are not the only written
instruments which contain consideration clauses. An examination
must therefore be made of parol evidence offered to vary or contra-
dict consideration clauses in other written instruments.
B. Instruments Other Than Deeds
Outside of deed cases, prior to 1893 few cases arose where the
determinative issue was the admissibility of parol evidence to vary or
contradict the consideration clause. Where the question arose, confu-
sion prevailed and decisions seemed to be based on rules noted previ-
ously as arising from deeds.
An indication of the attitude of the court toward this type problem
at this time is illustrated in the case of Price v. Reed. 4 A contract for
the sale of land between a third party and defendant contained a
statement of the purchase price. Plaintiff, a creditor of the third
10. Id. at 201. See McConnell v. Brayner, 63 Mo. 461 (1876); Laudman v.
Ingram, 49 Mo. 212 (1872).
11. Bobb v. Bobb, 89 Mo. 411, 4 S.W. 511 (1886) ; Wood v. Broadley, 76 Mo. 23
(1882); Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. v. Green, 68 Mo. 169 (1878); Fontaine v.
Boatmen's Say. Institution, 57 Mo. 552 (1874).
12. 81 Mo. 595 (1884).
13. Id. at 604. The court there made an interesting statement of another theory
which would bar such evidence. The court said that after the delivery of the
deed, "the rights and liabilities of the parties are measured and determined by
the contracts and covenants in the deed so delivered and accepted." Ibid. This is
the first indication given that any part of a deed may be viewed as a contract.
14. 38 Mo. App. 489 (1889).
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party, sued defendant on a note drawn by the third party, on the
theory that defendant had assumed payment of the note as part of
the consideration to the third party as grantor of the land. Defendant
sought to exclude parol evidence of his obligation on the note, since
no mention of it appeared in the consideration clause of the sale
contract. The evidence was admitted over plaintiff's objection and
a judgement for defendant was affirmed on appeal, the court stating:
In reference to all instruments ... it is now well settled that it
is competent by parol to show that no consideration was, in fact,
paid or received, or that the consideration was greater or less
than, or different from, the one expressed. This may be done for
every purpose except to impeach or destroy the instrument. The
amount or kind of consideration is not regarded an essential part
of the contract, and is open to contradiction or explanation like a
common receipt.15
Prior to 1893, no clear rationale had been established for deciding
questions of parol evidence to vary or contradict consideration clauses
in instruments other than deeds, and the rule controlling deeds was
often applied to other types of instruments, often with curious results.
II. THE JACKSON CASE-A NEW APPROACH
In 1893 a significant new approach to the problem of the admissi-
bility of parol evidence to vary or contradict stated consideration was
established. The case of Jackson v. Chicago, St. P. & K.C. Ry.' pre-
sented to the Kansas City Court of Appeals an unusual deed considera-
tion clause. Plaintiff landowner sued defendant railroad company for
damages resulting from water overflowing plaintiff's land, basing the
suit on defendant's failure to dig a ditch across a right of way plaintiff
had previously conveyed to defendant. Plaintiff contended that de-
fendant had orally promised to dig the ditch as a part of the considera-
tion of the right of way, although it was not mentioned in the deed.
The deed stated the consideration as $750 and further provided that:
the said railway company is to provide and maintain for the said
grantors, one grade farm crossing, and also one underground
cattle pass, and to haul and dump thereat all the stone desired by
the said George W. Jackson to pave the approaches to said cattle
pass, not exceeding four car loads. The grantors are to do the
paving, railway company to haul said stone within six months
after its railway is regularly running."'
15. Id. at 499. In Nedvidek v. Meyer, 46 Mo. 600 (1870), the court analogized
between a bill of sale and a deed. Cf. Liebke v. Knapp, 79 Mo. 22 (1883); Baile
v. St. Joseph Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 73 Mo. 371 (1881).
16. 54 Mo. App. 636 (1893).
17. Id. at 641.
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It was conceded that the defendant had fully performed all of the
obligations stated in the deed.
The trial court permitted plaintiff to show the oral promise by parol
over defendant's objection that the consideration expressed in the
deed was a matter of contract and could not be altered or added to
in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake. Defendant appealed
from a judgment for plaintiff, and the appellate court reversed, hold-
ing that parol evidence of the oral promise should not have been
admitted. The court indicated that consideration in a deed could be
stated in one of two ways: First, the consideration might be stated
as a recital which was defined as "the statement of the amount of
consideration... and the acknowledgement of its payment .... ."IS
From this definition it can be assumed that a consideration clause
reading: "In consideration of the sum of $250 paid to me this twelfth
day of March, 1962" would be a recital of consideration. The second
method of stating consideration is contractually. The court did not
expressly define this method, but in the discussion was the implication
that any clause which indicates that the consideration is to pass or be
performed in the future and has not already passed between the par-
ties will be considered contractual consideration. The court gave the
following as an example of contractual consideration: "In considera-
tion of the sum of one thousand dollars to be paid to me in beef cattle
weighing not less than one thousand two hundred pounds each, at
five cents per pound."'19
Based on this distinction, the court held that the consideration
clause in the Jackson deed was stated contractually. The court then
reasoned that since the consideration clause was stated contractually
the parties intended to be bound by the specific terms of the considera-
tion clause when they entered into the agreement. Since this was the
intent of the parties, the court reasoned that it would be improper to
subsequently permit a variance or modification of the clause by parol
evidence.
The court also discussed the problem of parol evidence to vary or
contradict those consideration clauses which were stated as recitals.
A recited consideration clause would have a two-fold effect: First,
in any action in which the amount of consideration was an issue, the
amount recited in the clause would be prima facie evidence of the
amount paid. Second, the recited consideration would estop the
grantor from showing a lack of consideration by parol. But parol
which varied the consideration clause was admissible for any other
purpose.
18. Id. at 643.
19. Id. at 644.
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One important question was not considered by the court. The
decision did not state whether the distinction between recited and
contractual consideration was to be applied only in cases involving
deeds, or whether it was also to apply to cases involving other written
instruments.
III. LIBERALIZATION OF THE RULE
The decisions which followed the Jackson case expanded the hold-
ing that contractual consideration clauses may not be varied by parol,
by including mortgages, 20 bills of sales, 21 releases,22 and contracts
in general.? However, the basis for distinguishing between recited
and contractual consideration has often been obscured, if not ignored.
A. Recited Consideration
On occasion the admissibility of parol has been determined by the
court from an examination of the consideration clause. If the lan-
guage used states the amount of consideration and aclmowledges its
receipt, the clause is normally held to be a mere recital and not
intended as binding by the parties.24 Therefore, parol evidence offered
to vary or contradict the clause is admissible. For example, in the
case of McDaniel v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis,2 plaintiff, in a
personal injury action, sought to avoid a release signed by him which
contained a consideration clause reading: "for and in consideration
of the sum of one hundred and seventy-five dollars ($175), Dr.
Brokaw's bill and St. John's Hospital bill, to me in hand paid by the
United Railways Company of St. Louis, the receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged.... ."I6 Plaintiff sought to show by parol that defendant
had orally promised that plaintiff would be treated only by a certain
specialist, one Dr. Brokaw, but that in fact, defendant secured a
different and less competent physician to treat him. The evidence was
20. Stringer v. Geiser Mfg. Co., 177 Mo. App. 234, 162 S.W. 645 (1914).
21. George 0. Richardson Mach. Co. v. Dix, 245 S.W. 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1922).
22. See, e.g., Gunter v. Standard Oil Co., 60 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1932); Tate v.
Wabash Ry., 131 Mo. App. 107, 110 S.W. 622 (1908); Williams v. Kansas City
Suburban Belt Ry., 85 Mo. App. 103 (1900).
23. See, e.g., Fox Midwest Theatres, Inc. v. Means, 221 F.2d 173 (8th Cir.
1955); Pile v. Bright, 156 Mo. App. 301, 137 S.W. 1017 (1911); Davis v. Gann,
63 Mo. App. 425 (1895).
24. Allaben v. Shelbourne, 357 Mo. 1205, 212 S.W.2d 719 (1948); Deal v. Ford,
204 S.W. 181 (Mo. 1928); Craig v. Koss Constr. Co., 69 S.W.2d 964 (Mo. Ct. App.
1934). The court in all these cases failed, however, to specifically use the defini-
tion of recited consideration given in the Jackson case. The Craig case considera-
tion clause seems to be promissory even though held otherwise.
25. 165 Mo. App. 678, 148 S.W. 464 (1912).
26. Id. at 687-88, 148 S.W. at 465.
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admitted over defendant's objection and upon appeal by defendant on
this issue the trial court ruling was affirmed. The court stated:
We see nothing contractual in the consideration clause of this
release. . . . It is true the contract of release follows thereafter,
but so much of the document as pertains to the consideration
merely recites the receipt of $175, Dr. Brokaw's bill and St.
John's Hospital bill as if in hand paid to plaintiff and acknowl-
edges a receipt to that effect. Obviously, there is no contract
contained in such clause.., and, unless the consideration clause
reveals itself to be contractual and reflects the intention of the
parties to that effect, it is competent to either contradict or ex-
plain it by showing other and additional considerations as well.2 7
This language indicates the purest application of the Jackson rationale.
Conversely, however, a substantial number of cases fail to examine
the language of the consideration clause with such particularity. In-
stead, the type of instrument involved is determinative as to whether
the consideration is a recital or not.28 A typical illustration of the ap-
plication of this rule is found in Lenox v. Earls29 in which grantor
conveyed lands to defendant-grantee by a deed expressing a con-
sideration of $2,500. The sisters of the grantor brought suit to im-
press a lien on the land, basing the suit on an agreement between the
grantor and defendant, made at the time the deed was transferred,
in which grantee promised to pay grantor's sisters the sum of $1,500
in lieu of the $2,500 stated in the deed. This evidence was admitted
over grantee's objection that the deed could not be varied by the writ-
ten agreement because of its effect on the consideration clause of the
deed. On appeal by the defendant from an adverse judgment the
court stated: "The law is well established, however, that the con-
sideration of a conveyance is generally open to explanation . . . 0
and affirmed the admission of the agreement even though it contra-
dicted the consideration of the deed.
The court here simply reverted to the earlier common law rule
which regarded all consideration clauses in deeds as recitals.31 No
27. Id. at 693, 148 S.W. at 467.
28. Finley v. Williams, 325 Mo. 688, 29 S.W.2d 103 (1930) ; Poplin v. Brown,
200 Mo. App. 255, 205 S.W. 411 (1918) ; Barry v. Bernays, 162 Mo. App. 27, 141
S.W. 933 (1911); Staed v. Rossier, 157 Mo. App. 300, 137 S.W. 901 (1911); See
v. Mallonee, 107 Mo. App. 721, 82 S.W. 557 (1904); Holt v. Holt, 57 Mo. App. 272
(1894). See Cave v. Wells, 319 Mo. 930, 5 S.W.2d 636 (1928); Goodman v.
Griffith, 238 Mo. 706, 142 S.W. 259 (1911) ; Edwards v. Latimer, 183 Mo. 610, 82
S.W. 109 (1904) ; Talbert v. Grist, 198 Mo. App. 492, 201 S.W. 906 (1918) ; Frase
v. Lee, 152 Mo. App. 562, 134 S.W. 10, aff'd, 160 Mo. App. 607, 140 S.W. 1194
(1911).
29. 185 S.W. 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916).
30. Id. at 234.
31. See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
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inquiry into the language of the consideration clause was even at-
tempted. This rationale that consideration clauses in conveyances
are recitals has been extended to include mortgages 2
Once a consideration clause is held to be a recital by either line of
reasoning, parol evidence which varies or contradicts the considera-
tion clause is admissible to show the actual consideration,13 the terms
of payment,34 or that additional oral promises were part of the con-
sideration3 5 This is in accord with the Jackson holding that parol is
not admissible for all purposes simply because the consideration
clause has been held a recital. As was indicated previously,30 the com-
mon law, after breaking away from the strict deed rule barring parol
for any purpose, began to admit parol to show consideration not
repugnant to the consideration recited in the deed and to show the
damages of a grantee in a breach of covenant action. However, parol
evidence which would impeach the validity of the deed was still
barred.37 Also the bar was extended to parol evidence which would
defeat the operative effect of a convenant in a deed.3 8 The Jackson case
recognized the limitation as to parol which sought to prevent the
operation of the deed as a conveyance of the property and based the
limitation on an estoppel theory. One who has signed the statement
acknowledging the receipt of a sum is estopped to later deny that
any sum was received in order to impeach the validity of the convey-
ance.39 The tendency still persists today to extend the application of
the estoppel theory to bar parol which abrogates the effect of cov-
enants contained in the deed.40
32. C. D. Johnson Farming Co. v. Goodwyn, 208 S.W. 110 (Mo. Ct. App. 1919);
Shantz v. Shriner, 167 Mo. App. 635, 150 S.W. 727 (1912).
33. Cave v. Wells, 319 Mo. 930, 5 S.W.2d 636 (1928); Goodman v. Griffith, 238
Mo. 706, 142 S.W. 259 (1911); Talbert v. Grist, 198 Mo. App. 492, 201 S.W. 906
(1918) ; Poplin v. Brown, 200 Mo. App. 255, 205 S.W. 411 (1918) ; Barry v. Ber-
nays, 162 Mo. App. 27, 141 S.W. 933 (1911) ; See v. Mallonee, 107 Mo. App. 721,
82 S.W. 557 (1904); Shantz v. Shriner, 167 Mo. App. 635, 150 S.W. 727 (1912);
Staed v. Rossier, 157 Mo. App. 300, 137 S.W. 901 (1911).
34. C. D. Johnson Farming Co. v. Goodwyn, 208 S.W. 110 (Mo. Ct. App. 1919).
35. Lennox v. Earls, 185 S.W. 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916); Holt v. Holt, 57 Mo.
App. 272 (1894).
36. Notes 7 and 8 supra.
37. Note 11 supra.
38. Note 12 supra.
39. Ott v. Pickard, 361 Mo. 823, 237 S.W. 2d 109 (1951) ; Schneider v. Johnson,
357 Mo. 245, 207 S.W.2d 461 (1948); Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 276 Mo. 471,208 S.W.
249 (1918) ; Chambers v. Chambers, 227 Mo. 262, 127 S.W. 86, (1910) ; Weissen-
fels v. Cable, 208 Mo. 515, 106 S.W. 1028 (1907); Strong v. Whybark, 204 Mo.
341, 102 S.W. 968 (1907); Wishart v. Gerhart, 105 Mo. App. 112, 78 S.W. 1094
(1904); Hickman v. Hickman, 55 Mo. App. 303 (1893).
40. In the following case, defendant grantor was barred from showing by
parol that no consideration had been paid so as to defeat action by grantee for
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In summary, consideration clauses will be held as recitals on one of
two theories: either because the language used in the clause shows
an intent by the parties to recite consideration; or, by virtue of the
type of instrument in which the consideration clause is found, it will
be conclusively presumed a recital and therefore variable by parol.
Once the clause is held to be a recital, parol evidence is generally
admissible for the purposes other than impeaching a deed as a con-
veyance or destroying the operative effect of covenants in a deed.
B. Contractual Consideration
Decisions subsequent to the Jackson case, in which the considera-
tion clause has been held contractual, have shown a strong tendency
to follow the reasoning in Jackson.41 The determination of whether
the consideration clause is contractual is made by looking to the
language used to express it and in viewing as contractual that which
is more than a mere statement of amount or acknowledgement of its
receipt.
This approach is illustrated in Pile v. Bright4 2 where the instru-
ment involved was a contract for the sale of land. The consideration
clause read that the:
party of the first part agrees to pay to parties of the second part
the sum of one hundred dollars as commission in full on said sale.
Parties of the second part agree to take their commission as fol-
lows: The second monthly payment made by the purchaser...
amounting to twenty dollars . .. shall be paid to parties of the
second part until the full sum of one hundred dollars shall have
been paid.43
Plaintiff, as party of the second part, sued to recover amounts still
owing on the commission. Defendant sought to show by parol that
plaintiff had promised orally that the purchaser of the land would
breach of covenants: Johnston v. Bank of Poplar Bluff, 221 Mo. App. 127, 294
S.W. 111 (1927). In Laclede Laundry Co. v. Freudenstein, 179 Mo. App. 175, 161
S.W. 593 (1913) and Brown v. Morgan, 56 Mo. App. 382 (1894), the grantor was
barred from showing by parol that grantee waived the covenants in the deed as
part of the consideration. Cf. Holloway v. Vincent, 143 Mo. App. 434, 128 S.W.
1009 (1910).
41. See, e.g., Fox Midwest Theatres, Inc. v. Means, 221 F.2d 173 (8th Cir.
1955) (contract); Stringer v. Geiser Mfg. Co., 177 Mo. App. 234, 162 S.W. 645(1914) (chattel mortgage); Pile v. Bright, 156 Mo. App. 301, 137 S.W. 1017
(1911) (sale of land contract); Tate v. Wabash R.R., 131 Mo. App. 107, 110
S.W. 622 (1908); Williams v. Kansas City Suburban Belt Ry., 85 Mo. App. 103
(1900) (releases). But see Bellows v. Porter, 201 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1953) ; State
ex rel. Alport v. Boyle-Pryor Constr. Co., 352 Mo. 1061, 180 S.W.2d 727 (1944);
Union Elec. Co. v. Fashion Square Bldg. Co., 165 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942).
42. 156 Mo. App. 301, 137 S.W. 1017 (1911).
43. Id. at 306, 137 S.W. at 1018.
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pay $500 of the purchase price to the defendants by a certain time
and also would take up a second mortgage on the property upon
defendants' request. The trial court held this evidence inadmissible.
Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed on appeal, the court stating:
This contract expressly states that defendant agrees to pay
plaintiffs $100 for services performed by them in selling her
property and shows beyond the possibility of cavil that the provi-
sion for the payment of commission for the particular services
already rendered was of the substance of the contract itself and
not a mere recital that could be contradicted, or explained away,
or added to, by parol testimony.44
Occasionally, examples can be found of a misapplication of the
Jackson reasoning resulting in a consideration clause which is clearly
a recital held to be contractual. For example, consideration clauses
reading "I hereby agree to accept, and do accept . . .the sum of five
thousand eight hundred dollars. . . .Received Jan. 5, 1905 . . .
and "Received of The Standard Oil Company . . . the sum of Two
Hundred & no/100 Dollars ($200.00) in full settlement and satisfac-
tion ...... ,4r were both held to be contractual, even though both state an
amount of money and acknowledge the receipt of that amount.
In summary, consideration clauses will be held contractual be-
cause of the language and method of expression used. If the clause
is stated promissorily, and not just a statement of an amount of
money followed by the acknowledgement of its receipt, the clause is
properly held contractual and not variable by parol.
IV. PAROL TO CLARIFY AMBIGUOUS STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION
Consideration clauses may be expressed in a way so as to be in-
definite as to their intended meaning. Clauses stating that in con-
sideration of an insignificant amount of money and "of love and
affection!'47 or "and other good and valuable consideration"" certainly
cannot indicate clearly what the intended consideration was. Parol
evidence offered to clarify the meaning of such phrases is always
admissible. 49 Similarly, instruments in which the consideration is
44. Id. at 308-09, 137 S.W. at 1019.
45. Tate v. Wabash R.R., 131 Mo. App. 107, 110-11, 110 S.W. 622, 623 (1908).
46. Gunter v. Standard Oil Co., 60 F.2d 389, 390 (8th Cir. 1932).
47. Edwards v. Latimer, 183 Mo. 610, 614, 82 S.W. 109(1904).
48. Finley v. Williams, 325 Mo. 688, 697, 29 S.W.2d 103, 106 (1930).
49. Ragan v. Schreffler, 306 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1957); Finley v. Williams, 325
Mo. 688, 29 S.W.2d 103 (1930); Edwards v. Latimer, 183 Mo. 610, 82 S.W. 109
(1904); cf. Hebbard v. American Zinc, Lead & Smelting Co., 66 F. Supp. 113
(W.D. Mo. 1946).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1962/iss2/6
PAROL EVIDENCE
not stated at all, 50 or is not clear as to meaning,51 may be explained by
parol evidence offered by either party to the agreement. Such admis-
sibility is not premised on contractual or recited statement of con-
sideration, but rather on the theory which permits ambiguities in a
written contract to be explained by parol.52
V. FALLACY IN PRESENT RULES
The problem of determining when parol evidence is admissible to
vary or contradict written consideraton is in need of a consistent
and uniform approach to all types of written instruments.
The doctrine first indicated in the Henderson case, 53 which permits
parol evidence to be introduced to vary or contradict written con-
sideration in deeds if the operative effect of the deed is not defeated
thereby, is not entirely satisfactory. This doctrine ignores the lan-
guage of the consideration clause completely and gives no opportunity
for the intent of the parties to play a role in deciding whether parol
is admissible or not. The application of this rule effectively establishes
an irrebuttable presumption that consideration clauses in certain in-
struments are recitals, the intent of the parties notwithstanding.
Nor does the Jackson rationale completely solve the problem. The
reasoning of the Jackson case permits determination of the intent
of the parties when determining the admissibility of parol, but only
indirectly by looking to the language used in the consideration clause.
If the clause is a statement of amount and the acknowledgement of its
receipt, the clause is only a statement of a past event. The law cannot
bind the parties to that which has taken place prior to the integra-
tion of the agreement and therefore the conclusion is that the parties
intended the clause as a recital and not subsequently binding. Con-
versely, if the language of the clause is not a statement of amount
and the acknowledgement of its receipt, it is held that the parties
have intended the consideration clause to be contractual and subse-
quently binding. However, the determination of intent solely by
analysis of the language of the consideration clause does not necessa-
rily guarantee that the true intent of the parties will be in accord
50. Heagy v. Cox, 191 Mo. App. 377, 177 S.W .684 (1915) ; cf. Hackney v. Har-
grove, 216 Mo. App. 202, 259 S.W. 495 (1924), which involved the consideration
for the sale of a partnership. The court permitted the defendant to show the con-
sideration by parol evidence, but relied in part on the fact that plaintiff had sought
to show a different consideration by parol and therefore could not object to defen-
dant showing consideration by parol.
51. Field v. Brown, 207 Mo. App. 55, 229 S.W. 445 (1921); cf. Walker v.
Modern Woodmen, Camp 5111, 190 Mo. App. 355, 177 S.W. 331 (1915).
52. See generally 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 579 (1960).
53. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
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with the interpretation of the court. For example, contracting parties
with no concept of the distinction betveen reciting consideration as
a fact and stating the consideration promissorily may innocently use
language in the consideration clause which is entirely inconsistent
with their actual intent. The Jackson reasoning would bar any parol
evidence to show what the parties intended, if the court considers
only the language used. This possibility has led to criticism of the
Jackson rationale:
These cases [holding parol inadmissible to show the intent of the
parties at the time the instrument was integrated] should be
disapproved, for the reason that if the testimony is true there
was no written integration of an actual agreement. In these
cases, the court seems to think that the writing proves its own
character and validity, or else that the plaintiff's testimony that
it was assented to as a complete integration of contract cannot
be rebutted by contradictory testimony by the defendant. 4
Thus the fallacy in the theory of Jackson is that it permits the writing
to prove its own character and conclusively presumes that contrary
testimony is not true.
CONCLUSION
If the intent of the parties is the determinative factor in deciding
the admissibility of parol to vary or contradict the consideration
clause, "this intent must be sought where always intent must be
sought, namely in the conduct and language of the parties and the
surrounding circumstances."5 5 The Jackson decision is a step in the
right direction, but is still short of reaching the ultimate goal. If the
issue of parol admissibility arises, evidence of what the parties
intended should be admissible. If the evidence of intent shows the
parties intended to be bound by the consideration clause, then the
clause was intended to be contractual, and parol which varies or con-
tradicts it should be inadmissible. If the evidence shows that the
parties merely intended the consideration clause as a statement of
an executed event, the clause should be viewed as a recital and parol
evidence should then be admissible. Only by this approach can the
court effectively and certainly decide the question of parol admissi-
bility in accord with the actual intent of the parties to any instrument.
54. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 577 (1960).
55. Id. at § 582.
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